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Comments on
"The Telecommunications Act of 1996,"
by Thomas G. Krattenmaker

LOFTUS E. BECKER, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

As always, it is hard to argue with what Dean Krattenmaker says.
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 is typically thoughtful, informed,
and elegantly written. He knows the Act, he knows the field, he knows
his strong points, and he disarms criticism by knowing (and saying)
when he can make a case but not prove it.
So there is little that Dean Krattenmaker says that I could debate,
and little that I will. However, his article leaves much unsaid, and I
want to talk about what he doesn't say.
His evaluative comments are based on three critical assumptions
one of fact, and two of value. The first assumption is that the telecommunications market is sufficiently like the economic model of markets
that it will work as theoretical markets should. A second, and more
important, assumption is that we need not, as a polity, be concerned
with what kind of a telecommunications system we want. What we
should want is nothing more (and nothing less) than what a properly
open market brings us. The final assumption is, or at least appears to
be, that if we are forced to choose between subsidizing some kind of
"universal access" to telecommunications and increasing the openness of
the telecommunications market, we should choose the latter.
I am not sure that the factual assumption is true, and I am not at
all sure that the values underlying the other two are mine - or should
be our collective values. I do not expect that I can prove my points;
-
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indeed, I am not sure that any are provable. I do, however, hope to
show that these parts of what Dean Krattenmaker leaves unsaid are, at
least, open to serious debate.
Thus, I have three main points.
First, it is important that we think about what kind of a telecommunications system we want to have - and not only in terms of its
technology and infrastructure, but also in terms of its content. Only if
we know what we want can we sensibly decide how to get there, or
even decide whether a given system of regulation is "successful" by the
only measure that, in my view, really counts. Finessing this question by
leaving the answer to the market is, for reasons discussed below, insufficient.
Second, even if one disagrees with my first point and concludes
that judgments of content should ultimately be left to the free choice of
autonomous individuals in a democratic society, the telecommunications
market is ill-suited to achieving that end.
Finally, and particularly if one is persuaded by my second point,
the goal of providing universal access may be far more important than
increasing the openness of the telecommunications market.

I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ULTIMATE GOALS

Regulation has purposes: except perhaps to the most Kafkaesque of
bureaucrats, regulation is not an end in itself. A discussion of means is
not merely informed by but indispensably tied to the ends sought to be
obtained. Before we can decide what parts of the new Act are wise or
unwise, we should decide what kind of telecommunications system we
want to develop. Before we can decide what kind of telecommunications system we want to develop, we need to decide what social functions we want it to serve.
Dean Krattenmaker's article says practically nothing about this. Its
focus is technological: telecommunications is simply a fancier and more
efficient form of smoke signals' - a clever and insightful metaphor if
one is concerned with the underlying technology, but I think misleading
if one is thinking of the functions that technology serves in our present
and future society. For telecommunications today is much more than a
medium of entertainment and private communication. It is already per-

1. Thomas J. Krattenmaker, The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 123,

126

(1996) (analogizing telecommunications and smoke signals).
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haps the chief mechanism through which our society informs itself
about the world around it, and carries on the discussion and debate
essential to a properly functioning democratic society. Telecommunications, in short, is not simply a modem amalgam of the theater and the
telegraph office. It is increasingly becoming our libraries, our schools,
and our town meetings, and it behooves us to think what those institutions will contain.
Some will argue that even thinking about what kind of a telecommunications system we want is inconsistent with the First Amendment.
Not so. Of course, the First Amendment does and should frequently
make us wary of governmental action. No doubt the First Amendment
forbids some actions that we might otherwise take to achieve what we
think of as a desirable telecommunications system. But there are many
others (such as government participation in the market) that are surely
untouched by the First Amendment, which forbids government to censor but not to publish. And surely the First Amendment never forbids
us from thinking.
It may well be that, having decided what kind of telecommunications system we would like to have, we will find the First Amendment
severely limits our ability to use governmental power to get it. The
First Amendment does not, however, eliminate such power. One might
conclude, for example, that problems with the private market should
lead to a substantial government (or government funded) presence in
telecommunication.'
And even if we are forbidden to act
governmentally, exhortation and other private exercises of power are the
essence of, not contrary to, freedom of speech.
Dean Krattenmaker says little about ultimate goals. He does refer to
"our reliance on market mechanisms to appraise and allocate goods and
resources, 3 and does reprise 4 "four criteria for measuring whether telecommunications

regulation serves ...

public ...

interest goals."

Those are, in brief, that governmental institutions should have no control over content; that government should foster access by "any speaker

2. Although many oppose governmental presence in radio and television, I know of nobody
who seriously opposes at least some governmental presence on the information superhighway, as

when the government makes available the text of statutes, judicial decisions, regulations, and
governmental information once routinely distributed in printed form, like Census Bureau data.
3. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 151.
4. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe Jr., Converging First Amendment Principlesfor
Converging Communications Media, 104 Yale L. 1719, 1726-32 (1995) (enumerating four
basic principles for government regulation of mass media).
5. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 151.
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willing [and presumably able] to pay the economic costs" of reaching a
"willing" audience; that government should "foster diversity," that is,
let people bid for and receive the information they want and are "willing [again, and presumably able] to pay the economic costs of re-

ceiving it"; and finally, that government may not sacrifice any one of
these three goals for the sake of any other.6
These regulatory goals are attractive (though some of their attrac-

tiveness may lie in their vagueness), but ultimately insufficient.
To the Twenty-First Century, the information superhighway - i.e.,
the telecommunications industry, - will be what books, newspapers,
and libraries were to the Nineteenth and Twentieth. 7 In other words, it
will be virtually the only way that people learn about the world and

how it works.' Should the content of our libraries really be determined
by the transient preferences of aggregated individuals? In one sense this

sounds like the ultimate in democracy. But I doubt the ultimate in
democracy is what we want.9

We do not want it in the political process. We could, if we were
so inclined, eliminate elective legislatures and make all legislation a
matter of general (electronically conducted) public referendums. But I,
for one, would shudder to live under such a system, and I am not sure

that a similar method for deciding what information about the world
should be generally available to American citizens is adequate.
From a policy point of view, I am happily indifferent to whether

6. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 152.
7. Let me reemphasize that I am referring not only to audio and video transmissions (television, cable, and so forth) but also to data transmission by computer. I do not expect printed
books to disappear, but I do expect that even public libraries will more and more rely on the
Internet and related technologies to distribute information. Of course, I am to some degree
overstating; no doubt people will continue to get some information by direct personal contact
with others.
8. For many, it may be that today. Wayne Anderson reports that about half his Sacramento
City College astronomy class believed the Government was engaged in a grand coverup of evidence of extraterrestrial visitors. Asked in their final writing assignment for the evidence supporting their views, only one cited a book; the remainder referred primarily to television programs, rarely distinguishing between fiction and (purported) nonfiction. "[Nlearly half of the
members of this college class were unable to cite any other evidence except television entertainment on a science topic." Wayne R. Anderson, What Constitutes Scientific Evidence, SKEPIrCAL INQUIRER, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 59,60.
9. Dean Krattenmaker notes that he does "not like" the "post-World War II British model"
of radio and television broadcasting, but his dislike appears to be entirely with process, not
with what was broadcast. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 151. He nowhere asks, for instance,
how well the British public was actually served by the broadcasting they had available, or
whether we are better served by our own broadcasting system.
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L.A. Law, Fawlty Towers, the Bill Cosby Show, or other, similar fare
is made available. What shows in our theaters can well be determined
by the gate receipts. But not, I think, what appears in our libraries, our
newspapers, and our school systems. Telecommunications is all of
these, and these are too important for their content to be determined by
the aggregate of transitory individual choices."0
Second, given my view of the importance of telecommunications, I
am deeply troubled by the emphasis Krattenmaker's and Powe's criteria
give to money. I am assuming here that "willing to pay"" includes
"able to pay" - and if this assumption is correct, then the criteria
limit votes in the National Telecommunications Policy Ballot to the
well-heeled. Of course, the costs of viewing at least some television
and cable transmissions will remain low enough that most people in the
country can watch something. The political system will assure this for
the foreseeable future. But the content of what everyone can view will,
it appears, be determined by those with the deepest pockets, the
market's electorate.
Dean Krattenmaker does want the government to foster "diversity"
in telecommunications services, although his definition of "diversity"
is less inclusive than the dictionary's and (I think) his inclusion of
diversity as a goal perhaps less attractive therefore. More fundamentally, however, diversity is not all it's cracked up to be. Certainly there is
much on the (very diverse) Internet the presence of which I deplore not
applaud-even though I heartily agree that government should not forbid it.
More fundamentally, however, I worry about the consequences to a
society where everyone can easily avoid anything that makes him or
her uncomfortable or angry. If conservatives listen only to Rush
Limbaugh and liberals only to Mario Cuomo, we have lost much of the
common ground that makes debate and discussion possible in a demo-

10. Judging from the Internet, a truly choice-drivcn television system would contain an enormous amount of explicit depictions of sex. Not only is there a lot of sex on the Internet now,
but many sites devoted to smut are shut down not by fears of censorship, but because they are

so popular that the server on which they reside becomes overloaded.
11. In this brave new world into which those with money will soon all be wired, one can

talk if one is "willing to pay the economic costs" of the speech, and one may listen if one is
"willing to pay the economic costs" of hearing the words. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 151.
With respect to the first, Dean Krattenmaker emphasizes that this "does not mean that government must or should require others to subsidize the would-be communicator." Krattenmaker,
supra note 1, at 151.
12. See Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 151.
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cratic society. At least occasionally, the two must be on the same program. If everyone hears only that news, and learns only those facts,
that support his or her existing beliefs, we are well on our way to a
social breakup that will rival Yugoslavia's. While some diversity is an
appropriate goal, I think that one measure of a genuinely good telecommunications system would be to provide a significant degree of common information and understanding.
Finally, even if I believed that our telecommunications system
should ultimately be determined (and modified) by transient consumer
preferences, I doubt that the telecommunications "market" is well suited
to achieving that goal, as I argue below.
II.

WHAT SHOULD WE WANT?

What the world of telecommunications should look like is one of
the hardest questions I can imagine, and I cannot pretend to provide an
answer. I do wish, however, to make a few observations.
First, as I have said before, I think it is a serious error to think of
radio and television - let alone the whole and increasingly converging
world of telecommunications - as nothing but entertainment media.
This may have been so in 1934 - but no longer. To be sure, much
that is broadcast is solely entertainment, but increasingly our people get
their news and much of their other information about how the world
works through broadcasting and cable. If that information is flawed if we are encouraging and expanding a system by which our people are
uninformed or misinformed - we're in deep trouble. 3 Telecommunications today is as much a medium of education (and a library) as it is
entertainment.
Some would say that the answer is simply more choice, more
sources of information, so that consumers who want good information
can get it. Perhaps. But choice is not an unalloyed blessing. 4 Unbridled
choice in the 19th century produced cocaine and opium addicts. Should
we be comfortable with a telecommunications system in which racists
13. And we may be. See supra note 9.
14. Choice imposes transaction costs: we have to decide which choice to make (and, for
many of us, worry later whether we made the right one). One day a man went to the
bookstore to buy an encyclopedia for his child. He found two, either of which he would have
purchased had it been the only one available, but he returned from the store empty-handed,
unable to decide between the two. For a fascinating study sparked by this experience, see
Shafir, Simonson & Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNITION 11 (1993).
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(at least racists with money) can watch all the television they want and
never have their assumptions challenged? I would not be.
Viewed from this perspective, I do not think that our existing system is very good. Viewed as libraries, schools, or information providers, radio and television are abominable. (And I have no reason to
believe that the system's major faults result from a market failure that
would be remedied by more "efficient" telecommunications markets.) I
am not here referring to the constant complaints of "media bias" and
the like, troubling though they sometimes are. 5 I am referring to more
subtle, and often much more pernicious, distortions - the elevation of
quackery over science 6 and the understandable but dangerous optimism
that pervades television shows.' 7
The information superhighway has different problems. As many
have remarked, there is a wealth of information on the Internet, most
of it useless or downright wrong. Indeed, much of what is good on the
Internet is provided by subsidized sources, either governmental or educational"8 - a fact which I think reinforces my position that governmental presence may be an important component of a good and useful
telecommunications system. The Internet as a significant commercial
entity is still new enough that it is quite possible to speculate that market forces will at least allay much of this problem; already, a variety of
sources are attempting to organize available information in a useful
way, 19 and perhaps they will succeed.

Ill.

THE MARKET-BASED APPROACH

I do not wish to deny the enormous value of economic market
theory, or downplay the great contributions that it has and presumably

15. The best studies I bnow of "bias" in broadcasting-which conclude that the media,
whether PBS or private, overwhelmingly present mainstream establishment vies-are collected
in DAVID CROTEAU & WILuAM HOYNES, BY INVITATION ONLY: How TIlE MEDIA LIMIT PUB-

Lic DEBATE (1996).
16. See, e.g., CARL SAGAN, THE DEMON-HAUNTED WORLD: SCIENCE AS A CANDLE IN THE
DARK, 13-16, 373-377 (1995).

17. See Susan J.Diem et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation on Televislon-Aflracles and
Misinformation, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1578 (1996) (discussing unrealistic portrayal of CPR
survival rates on television and ensuing public misperceptions).
18. Examples include the stunning collection of federal statistical data accessible through
<http'lwww.census.gov/mainlwww/stat-fcd.html>, or Comell's Legal Information Institute at
<http://www.law.co mell.eduflii.htmi>.

19. For example, <http.//home.netscape.comhome/intemet-search.html>
collection of very different search engines.

references an excellent
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will continue to make to our understanding and welfare. But
microeconomics, like other branches of psychology,2" is far from perfect,2' and like the other branches, often more powerful in retrospective

explanation than in prediction.22 Thus, we should not be overconfident
in predicting that any market in reality will do what that market is
supposed to do in economic theory.23
Market theory assumes, among other things, that human beings are
rational decision makers with good information about the market in

question. To the extent either assumption is wrong, the market will not
work as it should. And there is good reason to question both assumptions.

Most of us, of course, like to think that we and our brethren are
rational animals. But it is not just folk wisdom that questions this assumption. 24 An increasing number of studies of human choice has suggested that in important ways, irrational methods of decision making
are rooted deep in the human brain, causing people to behave in ways
which, in turn, cause markets to behave differently in practice from
what market theory predicts.25
Nor is there much reason to believe that we and our brethren are
particularly well informed about the choices that we make. Of course,
if one thinks of the telecommunications system as simply an amalgam
of entertainment and individual communication, we are. We know well

20. Economics is one of many disciplines that attempts to understand and predict human
behavior. That it relies heavily on mathematical tools to do this may make it appealing, but it
does not make it any less of a psychology.
21. For example, Alan Greenspan persuasively predicted that the Reagan tax cuts would
produce a substantial budget surplus. For a charming explanation of why his prediction was so
badly wrong, see Alan Murray, Another Dole Hurdle: Reverse Murphy's Law, WALL ST. J.,
July 29, 1996, at Al.
22. Indeed, it may be that, like weather forecasting (an equally mathematical discipline), the
period over which accurate economic predictions can be made is distinctly limited. See James
Gleick, Chaos 11-23 (1987) (describing the discovery of the link between aperiodicity and unpredictability, or sensitive dependence on initial conditions, arising from Edward Lorcnz's computerized weather model).
23. Dean Krattenmaker does not seem to be exceptionally confident about his predictions. He
explains that several features of the new Act are "indisputably 'good,"' but he never claims
that they will improve our welfare in any way, only that they "should." Krattenmaker, supra
note 1, at 152.
24. "[E]very member of the human race, from Jojo the cave man right down to that final
culmination of civilization, namely me, has been as eccentric as a pet coon - once you
caught him with his mask off." Robert A. Heinlein, The Rolling Stones 59 (1952).
25. The growing body of literature is summarized in MASSIMO PIATELLI-PALMARINI, INEVITABLE ILLUSIONS (Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini & Keith Botsford trans., 1994). The book Includes an excellent bibliography. Id. at 231-236.
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enough whether we enjoyed watching the Olympics, or whether the
phone call from Uncle Fritz was sufficiently clear and free from interference.26 But we know very little about the quality of the information
that comes into our homes - and our minds and, from there, influences if not determines our votes and public behavior27
If the theory is weak, what about the practice? Existing examples
of what open markets produce are not entirely encouraging to me.
After all it is Congress, which increasingly is beginning to look like an
open, unregulated market in legislation,28 that gave birth to the Telecommunications Act with which Dean Krattenmaker is so deeply disappointed. The savings and loan debacle was the direct result of deregulating savings and loan institutions.29 And the ridiculous (at least from a
consumer's point of view), constantly changing, and unknowable system
of airline fares may be economically efficient - it should be, if market
theory is correct - but is for airline travelers frustrating, wasteful of
time, and aggravating.
Even if markets work well in general (and I have no doubt they
sometimes do, although I think their efficacy is often overrated), I am
dubious about their utility in setting telecommunications policy. It is
important to remember that the market model follows the golden rule:
he who has the gold makes the rules.
Although we have seen a few, very limited experiments in "pay per
view" television, for the foreseeable future much of the available video
fare will be funded, primarily, by advertising revenues. And advertisers
don't want eyes, they want wallets. The gross number of viewers a
program attracts is far less important than the number of viewers with
loose cash to spend on the advertised product. The same is increasingly
true of so-called public broadcasting, which has been devoting more
and more of its time to advertising 0 and raising more and more of its
revenues from viewer and listener contributions.

26. We do not know - in most cases - who else is listening in, as many have later
found to their dismay, a problem that will be exacerbated in the future.
27. See sources cited supra notes 16-17.
28. Cf. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 131 nA5 (suggesting that the new Act might be
largely explained as an amalgam of the interests of large contributors to legislators with the
power to shape the Act's contours).
29. Of course, it was not deregulation that forced taxpayers to foot so much of the bill.
That was a result of deregulating the industry but continuing to provide federal insurance at
rates perhaps appropriate for the industry in its regulated state but highly unrealistic otherwise.
30. So far, of course, most of this advertising is "goodwill" advertising, typically less obnoxious, but also less informative and less entertaining, than the advertising one can see on NBC.
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We can see and hear the results every day. Anyone worrying about
how to fillet that freshly-bought salmon can choose among half a dozen
cooking programs (and even an entire cooking channel on cable). We
can easily hear how Martha Stewart would have us rework our gardens,
learn how to renovate that charming Colonial house in the country, or
find out how many inches of powder and base are at the ski resorts.
But a viewer who wants to learn how to deal with the welfare bureaucracy, how to find a new job after being fired, how to help kids dodge
bullets and drug dealers on the way to school, or how to protect
against a threatened eviction is simply out of luck. Can anyone seriously maintain that the present mix serves all our people well, and not just
the middle class and wealthy? If not, is there any reason to believe that
more reliance on market choice will improve matters?
IV.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNIVERSAL ACCESS

Finally, I would like to make a few observations about "universal
service," a goal to which Dean Krattenmaker expresses some sympathy3" but which he concludes is so deeply in conflict with his goal of
"properly functioning competitive telecommunications markets" that its
inclusion in the 1996 Act is not merely a bad, but a genuinely "ugly"
feature of the Act.32
In essence, Dean Krattenmaker's argument is that "[u]niversal service, as defined in the new Act, and competitive markets cannot coexist, where the goods produced have many substitutes or where the technology is dynamic";33 that telecommunications technology is indeed
dynamic; and that therefore we should sacrifice universal service to
preserve competitive markets.
I do not want to make a major issue of the possibility of coexistence, though I would observe that the point is not quite as obvious as
Dean Krattenmaker would have it.34 Nor do I dispute his point that the

31. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 166. He does find it offensive that just what "universal
service" we seek to provide can grow over time. Id. at 144.
32. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 164-166.
33. Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 164-166.
34. In text, Dean Krattenmaker tells us that "we have already learned" that "we cannot"
give pro-social subsidies in the manner the Act commands "unless we dictate that that industry
be monopolized." Krattenmaker, supra note 1, at 166. In the footnote, however, history only
shows that such pro-social subsidies "virtually always" become competitive handicaps. Id. atl:6
n.216.
Moreover, his argument is overstated. He argues that under a tax-based subsidy system
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definition of "universal service" is vague and subject to change over
time." I do, however, wish to reemphasize that universal service - if I
am right in thinking that the "services" involved will touch the heart of
how information is distributed throughout the next century - is not
just a question of cheap access to Beavis and Butthead, but the linchpin
of our maintenance of an informed citizenry. We cannot live, we cannot survive, without this. If we are indeed forced to choose between
universal service and an open competitive market in telecommunications, I have no doubt where my choice lies.
V.

CONCLUSION

Increasingly, radio and television (and similar services like cable)
are not merely luxuries for entertainment; they are a critical part of the
structure of common information that binds our society together. In my
view, therefore, it is important that we think about what kind of telecommunications system we would like to have, instead of simply finessing the question36 by leaving it to so-called open markets and transient consumer choice. If we ask that question, I think we will conclude that there is a significant part for government to play in the telecommunications arena, both in providing content and in moving towards a goal of broad-based access to basic services.
Markets are sometimes good but never perfect. The telecommunications market has been particularly imperfect in the past, and there is
no reason to believe that further "openness" will remedy those failings.
Additional competition may be beneficial for other reasons, but it is no
panacea. Judging the 1996 Act simply in terms of its success in removing barriers to competition is judging on an incomplete scale.

companies will have an incentive to move to technologies that are "(a) not as efficient as existing telecommunications services but (b) not subject to the tax." Krattenmaker, supra note 1 at

165. Of course, the economic incentive is only to move to services that are not subject to the
tax; only sometimes (namely, when the cost of the inefficiency was less than the tax and there
was no more efficient, untaxed alternative) would any rational company choose (a).
35. I can understand Dean Krattenmaker's concern over the vagueness of the term, though it
is hardly less clear than many other terms historically left to administrative filling out, such as
the "unfair labor practices" the NLRB is to prohibit. I am, though, puzzled by his apparent
distaste for allowing the term to expand over time. Surely a wise legislature defining, for instance, a minimally adequate education in 1900 would have been well advised to allow the

concept to vary as times changed.
36. Bridge players, particularly those lucky in love, will be well aware of the dangers of

finessing.

